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BOOK DEPARTMENT 
significant a conclusion fairly be built on 
such an insecure base? 
ALPHONSE B. MILLER 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
MEAD, DAVID. Yankee Eloquence in the 
Middle West: The Ohio Lyceum, 1850- 
1870. Pp. viii, 273. East Lansing: The 
Michigan State College Press, 1951. 
$4.50. 
The vogue of oratory and public speech 
as a characteristic expression of American 
culture in the nineteenth century has been 
the subject of many recent investigations. 
Gradually the whole story, from the flashy 
performances of political and patriotic ora- 
tors to the quiet dissemination of ideals 
through nonpulpit sermonizing, has been as- 
suming shape. This highly limited and spe- 
cialized study of one phase of the move- 
ment has its place in this story. 
Mr. Mead takes a single state of the 
Middle Western group-Ohio-as his field. 
It is perhaps representative of the other 
states for the purposes of this study, but it 
has the additional interest of being the first 
state west of the Alleghenies to receive, 
imitate, and reject the influence of Eastern 
seaboard culture. The period 1850-1870 
further limits the study to that part of 
the process centering on the Civil War pe- 
riod, even though the lecture movement 
was well established before 1850 and did 
not cease at 1870. Mr. Mead's evidence is 
also largely restricted. He depends almost 
wholly on the reports of lectures as printed 
in the contemporaneous local newspapers. 
He does not investigate the lectures them- 
selves in the relatively few instances in 
which actual manuscripts have survived, 
nor does he attempt many other means of 
measuring and evaluating either the lec- 
tures or their public reception. 
Within these limitations, all of them 
arbitrary and all of them consistently im- 
posed, Mr. Mead has done a thorough job. 
For the cultural historian, the most in- 
teresting part of his book is Appendix A- 
"A History of Ohio's Lecture System," a 
sixty-page essay in which the story is told 
chronologically, the phases of cultural evo- 
lution clearly marked, and the larger im- 
plications of the process distinguished. The 
main body of the book is a series of char- 
acter sketches of the more important of the 
lecturers, interesting each in its way, but 
lacking in social or cultural significance 
apart from the lecturing experience taken 
as a whole. 
ROBERT E. SPILLER 
University of Pennsylvania 
STONE, JULIUS. The Providence and Func- 
tion of Law: Law as Logic, Justice, and 
Social Control-A Study in Jurispru- 
dence. Pp. lxi, 918. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1950. $10.00. 
This book has been reviewed widely and 
favorably in many journals, and it is with- 
out doubt an important work, especially for 
specialists in jurisprudence and political 
theory. The author's style is excellent, 
and he has brought a high order of com- 
petence and almost unbelievable industry, 
extending over a period of fourteen years, 
to the production of this treatise. Yet it 
is no adverse criticism of Stone to conclude 
that, despite its strong points, he might 
have devoted his efforts and splendid talent 
to more worthy projects which would give 
his own thinking better opportunities for 
adequate expression. 
Stone's book is a memorial to Pound and 
his course in jurisprudence. Anyone who 
took Pound's course will immediately rec- 
ognize the familiar names and summaries 
of the thought of modern legal philoso- 
phers-Austin, Roguin, Grotius, Blackstone, 
Bentham, Jhering, Stammler, Kohler, Sa- 
vigny, Duguit, Maine, the theory of inter- 
ests, and all the rest of the Pound seminar. 
Stone has rounded out Pound's survey, and 
he has added detailed annotations and bib- 
liographies. The Pound-Stone summaries 
and the bibliographies will be helpful to 
researchers in the field. But the book, 
from the very nature of its conception, 
lacks incisive analysis and imaginative for- 
mulation of current important problems of 
legal philosophy. 
So far as students and the teaching of 
jurisprudence are concerned, the Stone 
treatise can best be used as supplementary 
reading. History of philosophy is hardly 
taught in respectable schools as a series of 
summaries of what Plato, Aristotle, Kant, 
and others thought. The objective now, at 
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least on the college level, is to teach stu- 
dents how to philosophize. Stone's book 
is in the older, outmoded tradition; it is 
mostly a book about, rather than of, legal 
philosophy, though he does interpolate his 
own criticism. Such summarizing, even 
with the added criticism, does not ex- 
emplify philosophical problem-solving. It 
is far better, in the reviewer's judgment, to 
have students read the original work of 
legal philosophers, dead and living, with 
attention directed to its relevance for cur- 
rent issues and to what is involved in de- 
veloping and defending one's own legal phi- 
losophy than to fill them with summaries 
that lay it all out digested and "finished." 
That kind of instruction has become 
dated, but obviously it has not been for- 
gotten. What has happened in the past 
fifteen years in the teaching of jurispru- 
dence cannot be here reported. It must 
suffice to say that jurisprudence has come 
to life and is grappling with the major 
problems of our times. Both the teacher 
of jurisprudence and his students will there- 
fore prefer fresher waters and the joys of 
live combat, which the Stone chronicle un- 
fortunately does not provide. This is a 
regrettable report especially for one who, 
like this reviewer, admires Stone's scholar- 
ship and his clear, facile writing. 
JEROME HALL 
Indiana University Law School 
HAMBURGER, MAX. Morals and Law: The 
Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory. Pp. 
xxii, 191. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1951. $3.75. 
"There is a perfect harmony between 
Aristotle's ethical, legal, and political theory 
-the theory of the right mean is the basis; 
philia, social sympathy, is the life force; 
equity, fairness, reasonableness, and hu- 
maneness the leitmotiv; and well-being, i.e., 
human happiness and perfection, the su- 
preme end." 
So states Dr. Hamburger in his conclud- 
ing paragraph. The main body of the work, 
subsequent to a brief inquiry into the au- 
thenticity of Aristotelian texts and a brief 
statement of Platonic views on law and 
morals, is a detailed examination of rele- 
vant Aristotelian texts and a comparison 
of differences in their arguments, together 
with smaller sections devoted to historical 
setting and to summary of arguments. It 
is divided into three sections, dealing, re- 
spectively, with "Voluntary Action and 
Choice (Theory of Culpability)," "On Law 
and Justice," and "On Friendship (Philia) 
(Community, Partnership, Contract)." 
The author stresses the fact that Aris- 
totle's theory of law is part of and derives 
from a total theory of ethics and politics. 
He emphasizes the degree to which the 
Aristotelian theory of law is permeated by 
Aristotle's doctrine of the mean; is in its 
tenor constitutionalist; and is, like all Aris- 
totle's social thought, opposed to a false 
precision in the name of science which is 
unwarranted by the nature of human be- 
ings, and by reason of that judgment which 
they must inevitably exercise in the midst 
of uncertainties. It stresses, again, the 
fact that law relates intimately to justice 
and that the two together are at once the 
foundation and the proper ruling end of the 
state; it thus shows the continuity between 
Aristotelian thinking and later Roman law 
with its Stoic foundations and its dominant 
concept of equity. 
In an interesting summary of his third 
part, Hamburger also demonstrates how 
Roman law, thus properly understood, was 
subsequently misinterpreted, and how, from 
Bacon to Savigny, the false search for 
scientific certainty led to a misconception 
of law, partly overcome by the subsequent 
efforts of von Jhering, but also offset by 
legal realism and legal pragmatism (the 
two are not, he insists, the same), though 
both these last tended to achieve their work 
by an illegitimate divorcing of law from 
its philosophical foundation, and from its 
proper status as part of a total doctrine of 
man and society. 
The main body of the work will be of in- 
terest only to the specialist, though its over- 
all conclusions are of more general concern. 
The brilliant foreword of just over three 
pages by Huntington Cairns makes more 
significant generalizations on the course of 
development of Western legal thought than 
one would have believed possible in so 
brief a space. 
THOMAS I COOK 
Johns Hopkins University 
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